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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
The Boeing 737 “Next Generation” (NG) is the follow-on to the longest continuous
production line in commercial aircraft history.  The original 737 (-100) was launched in
February of 1965, followed by the –200, -300, -400, and –500 models, and by completion
of the “Classic” Program,
in 1993, 3132 737s had
been delivered.  The Next
Generation 737 represented
a radical redesign of the
aircraft, including the –600,
-700, -800, -900, “Combi”
(-700C), and Business Jet
(BBJ) models, to be
superior to competitors
such as the Airbus A320
series and the McDonnell
Douglas MD-90.  The
airplane falls under Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, which is a subdivision of the
Boeing Company.  Customers for the aircraft include major airlines around the globe in
addition to customers who use the plane for cargo, such as the United States Navy.
1.2 Main Findings
The 737 Fuselage story is very impressive.  First of all, the plant ramped up production
from 10 to 28 planes per month, which in itself is remarkable, but in this time, several
other lean principles were set in motion, leading to great improvements.  For example,
flow time in the factory was reduced by 21 percent, while creating capacity to add work
content from the Boeing final assembly plant in Renton, WA.  Furthermore from 1998 to
2000, labor hours per unit were reduced by nearly 50 percent.  Unit cost was reduced by
25 percent over the same period.
Figure 1: Boeing 737 Family (courtesy Boeing Co.)
1.3 Approach
A two-day site visit to Boeing Commercial Aircraft Company – Wichita was undertaken
in January 2002.  The 737 Director of the Structural Value Stream and his staff made
formal presentations, plus we had an opportunity to participate in a weekly Review Team
Meeting of the Value Stream Production Line Managers.  A complete factory tour
consisted of reviewing the schedule, cost, quality, morale, and safety metrics at each line
location and an opportunity to interview the Production Line Manager (PLM) in his or
her workplace.
A two-hour formal interview with the entire Structural Value Stream Organization gave
us a chance to present our structured interview questions and derive the benefit of the
entire group in formulating the responses.
1.4 Organization of the Report
The remainder of this report will describe the program and product and an overview of
the whole picture—the extended enterprise.  The study will continue to look at the
implementation of lean, including highlights and achievements, enablers and practices, as
well as external factors and developments.  That is followed by a look at remaining
challenges and future opportunities, and the paper is concluded with a section on “lessons
learned” and final observations.
2 CASE STUDY PROFILE
2.1 Summary Case Study Profile
The 737 Next Generation Aircraft was a major product “overhaul” to assure continuation
of Boeing’s most successful commercial production aircraft, the 737 Classic.  With over
3000 aircraft built and sold, and with increasing competition from Airbus with its A-320
family and McDonnell Douglas with its newly introduced MD-90, Boeing conceived of a
family of larger 737 aircraft with significantly improved economics for the airlines and
longer ranges permitting more city-pairs of destinations.  The 737 models 600, 700, 800
and the new 900 have been designed, FAA Certified and sold to the world’s airlines.  At
this writing over 1100 Next Generation 737 aircraft have been built with the production
line achieving a peak rate of 28 aircraft per month—an absolute industry record for the
most pounds of aircraft produced on a monthly basis in the history of commercial
aviation.  Figure 2 shows the general arrangement of the 737 NG and shows the features
and performance.  Passenger capacity ranges from 110 to 189, and is capable of ranges of
approximately 3000 miles for the commercial passenger planes to as far as 6200 miles for
the Boeing 737 Business Jet, known as the “BBJ”.
2.2 Larger Organizational Context
Our case study focused on the 737 Airframe designed and produced by Boeing’s Wichita
division.  The 737 Structures Value Stream Organization at Wichita consists of all the
functional organizations required to design, production engineer, plan, fabricate, procure,
assure quality, and assemble the 737 fuselage.  Boeing Wichita is one of several
significant organizational elements of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company which
is headquartered in Renton, Washington (other elements of the BCA are in Everett, WA,
where the 747, 767, and 777 are produced; Auburn, WA for fabrication and machining;
Spokane, WA for composite structures; Portland, OR for major machine parts; and Tulsa,
OK for major assemblies).  The new corporate headquarters for the Boeing Company is
in Chicago, Illinois.
Figure 2: Boeing 737 Features (courtesy Boeing Co.)
The driving forces that lead to huge lean achievements on the 737 were a combination of
circumstances.  First, Boeing launched the marketing efforts on the Next Generation 737
at the right time, and its overall appeal to the airlines was overwhelming, resulting in a
huge sales—and therefore, production backlog.  This caused Boeing to have to accelerate
the production line to 28 per month, a remarkable task which had never been done by a
commercial airplane manufacturer.
Second, Boeing had been working Lean for several years, starting with significant quality
and production initiatives including Quality Circles, Continuous Quality Improvement
(CQI) and the immense effort to adapt the Toyota Production System (TPS) through the
use of the Shinijutsu Consultancy (ex-Toyota executives that taught practical lean
concepts by having Boeing executives working for a week on Japanese production lines).
The resulting Lean application at Boeing is known as the “BPS”, or the Boeing
Production System.  For example, “Kaizen events” are known as “Accelerated
Improvement Workshops,” or AIWs, allowing for any cultural sensitivity by U.S.
workers.
The “Turning Point” that caused the gigantic lean “push” at Boeing Wichita on the 737
was clearly the requirement to be able to meet the very ambitious delivery commitments
to the airlines, at the stated price—intended to be on par with the Classic, despite
significant improvements.  To achieve the very aggressive cycle times, all Lean
Principles had to be employed simultaneously!
Wichita’s largest supplier is Alcoa, who provides all the aluminum used for sheet metal
skins, forgings, bar stock, plate for high speed machining, etc.  One of the key events in
Wichita’s lean transformation was the amount of learning the 737 Structures Value
Stream Team acquired by working closely with its supplier, Alcoa.  Alcoa had forced
itself to become lean and had implemented a series of organizational concepts (the “A-3”
Value Stream roadmap) for systematic application of Lean including “as-is”, “to-be”,
goals, milestones, and metrics and the concepts of “Lean Academies”.
Boeing Wichita aggressively pursued Lean principles to drive the culture change for the
entire 737 Program and enlisted the support of organized labor, their local IAM union
chapter.  They have been so successful in getting total workforce “ownership” and buy-
in, that one of the IAM Union Stewards is the Lean Leader in one of the fuselage
sections.  Workforce training in the Boeing Production System (BPS)—Boeing’s
adaptation of the Toyota Production System—is very important, and the extent to which
Lean in the various divisions has been formally trained is as follows:
Lean Basics Training 80-90% of 737 Program employees
Employee Participation in Lean Academy 30-80%
Training in Standard Operations 20-60% (Bands represent training
across the 7 elements of the 737 Structures Value Stream Organization)
Wichita has implemented a 5 Level Lean Self-Assessment Tool (LESAT), and uses it to
determine progress towards 100 percent lean proficiency across the organization.  The
extensive diffusion of lean principles and the continuous drive for additional
improvements through weekly progress meetings and recognition programs are major
elements in the success of the 737.
3. EVOLUTION OF LEAN IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Highlights of Lean Transformation
The Boeing 737 had a successful heritage, and the Next Generation was no exception.
Due to intense aircraft market pressures, as mentioned above, the Next Generation was
designed to be more attractive to customers, both from features and cost standpoints.
Built upon past success, it was designed to have lower direct operating costs, greater
passenger capacity and range performance, all without requiring large non-recurring
training, spares, and airport infrastructure costs associated with introducing a new model
to the airline.  As a result, orders skyrocketed, and Boeing had to commit to a production
rate of 28 per month, up from 10 per month.  The result was that Wichita was faced with
the significant challenge of using every resource available to “climb the hill” of a vast
acceleration of production.
Their multi-faceted production acceleration plan involved the following:
1. Pursue building of a more complete aircraft
per month by building larger assemblies with
fewer parts.
2. Establish “market-driven target costing”
(MDTC) as the driver of factory unit cost
targets.
3. The use of Determinant Assembly, allowing
the power of Computer Aided Design (CAD)
to establish necessary geometries for DNC
drilled holes with proper tolerances for ease of
assembly.
4. Co-located IPT teams, many on the factory floor, with highly visible metrics of
cycle time, unit cost, quality, safety, morale, and attendance, among others.
5. Investment exceeding 100 million dollars in capital equipment, including 19
Brotje Ring Riveters, which install more than 90 percent of the nearly 100,000
fasteners on each 737 fuselage, at a rate of more than one aircraft per day.  The
result is reduced unit labor costs, fewer hole-drilling defects, and superior skin
quality.
6. Flexible tooling, to permit rapid transition among the 7 various models of the 737.
CATIA-identified NC drilled holes for joining fuselage sections with laser
alignment, culminating in the reduction (from large tooling jigs and hand drilling)
of at least 10 days in flow time on each 737.
7. A Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) program was implemented using
Autonomous Improvement Workshops (AMW) to assure that equipment
breakdowns were not a cause of production bottlenecks.
8. The overall business parameter or metric used by the Boeing Company, including
Wichita, is Economic Profit (EP).  All business decisions are made using the
impact on EP as the guiding principle. (See Figure 3)
Timeline:
1993
• 737 IPTs
• Determinant
Assembly Introduction
1996
• Lean Manufacturing
1999
• Boeing Production
System
2000
• Value Chain Strategy
Figure 3: Boeing Economic Profit Calculator
9. In addition to large capital investments in machinery, individual “Chuka-Chuka”
lines have been inexpensively created to support single-piece flow.  One such line
produces 1 part every 60 seconds.
The plans were implemented with great success, some of which is evident in the next
section.
Although the acceleration of production rate started in the 1997-1998 timeframe, with the
initiation of the Next Generation 737, the Boeing personnel we interviewed were clear
that the giant steps forward in Lean did not occur until “critical mass” was achieved in
terms of (1) Sufficient top down management alignment and (2) Factory employees
receiving Lean training and proficiency.  There were many steps along the way!
The first of these steps was to initiate a culture change.  To do this, a new organizational
structure, the 737 Value Chain team, was put in place with a lean savvy team.  The
organization featured co-located IPTs involving Engineering, Manufacturing, Quality,
and Supplier personnel as necessary, co-located on the factory floor next to their assigned
structural assembly section.  In addition, a factory design was conceived to handle
“mixed-model” production.  Not only were entire fuselages of the seven 737 NG variants
to be built, but critical sections of the 747, 757, 767, and 777 as well, all of which were
accelerating in production at the same time in the same factory at Wichita.  Furthermore,
new leadership in the 737 Value Chain Organization championed lean, and provided the
leadership and encouragement to overcome hurdles and achieve the unprecedented
manufacturing rates.  Finally, Supplier Chain networks were established, wherein
individual suppliers provide daily supplies of needed parts and standards directly to the
point- of- use in the 737 Assembly Area.  “Min-Max” usage concepts are used as are
specially designed kits packaged to minimize material handling.  These are among many
concepts and improvements made across the factory floor and up the chain of command.
3.2 Major Achievements
The result of these initiatives was phenomenal.  The 737 Fuselage team was able to
achieve some significant firsts.  The first Model 900 was introduced at a lower unit cost
than the 200th Model 800 that preceded it.  Most impressive is the learning associated
with the new model (see the Unit Time, Appendix A).  There are two very interesting
things to note about this chart.  First of all, note the lack of peaks in the 737 Next
Generation (red or lower) line--the introduction of change without an associated “spikes”
in the learning curve is unprecedented!  Another impressive fact is that despite years of
learning on the 737 Classic, the unit time for the 737 from the Classic to the Next
Generation was reduced of 40.3 percent at the same unit number.  Even the from the final
737 to the new 737 flow time was reduced by 21 percent.  Mentioned earlier was the fact
that IAM Union buy-in was crucial to success.  In order to achieve Takt Time and to
preserve the workforce in a period of rapidly decreasing cycle time, 737 factory
employees were cross-trained to be able to do more than one operation.
Flexibility—even on the individual level—helps achieve lower unit costs and improves
quality.  With vastly improved modularity and agility in the new factory design, not only
is Wichita capable of producing seven different models of the 737 simultaneously, but
can incorporate airline specific customization features with as little as a few days
notification.  Furthermore, with a reduction in suppliers, and improved supplier relations,
major suppliers are providing more immediately useful products to their point of use.
Alcoa, for example, now provides all forms of aluminum skins, plates, forgings, bar
stock—cut to size—required to fabricate and assemble the fuselage.
Associated with these drastic changes
are some undeniable statistics.  To
achieve the accelerated production
rate, quality had to improve.  With a lot
of hard work devoted to root cause
identification and corrective action,
quality did improve!  Significant
repair, which is both a disruption to
flow time, and indicates an inverse
measure of quality, has been reduced
by over 50 percent (see Figure 4).
Scrap costs, a measure of waste, has
been reduced by over 60 percent, as
seen in Figure 5.  Rework / repair
costs, which are perhaps the most
direct measure of quality has been
reduced by about 50 percent, along
with “Pickups” and Non-
Conformance Records, which have
dropped by about 40 percent.  Since
labor is the largest cost in airplane
production, it is an excellent metric
by which to judge performance.  In
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Figure 4: Significant Repair Items/Unit
Figure 5: Scrap/Unit
Figure 6: Rework & Repair
this department, there has been
significant reduction, which can be
seen in Figure 6.  Perhaps the most
impressive statistics are from the
Total Unit Cost, which is the
culmination of all the lean practices
that Wichita has put in place.  As
shown in Figure 7, not only has the
total unit cost come down
significantly, but also forecasts indicate that Wichita will continue to improve beyond
already aggressively low targeted costs.
3.3 Key Enablers, Processes, and Practices
Along the road, there were some significant essentials to lean.  Some of the major
overarching elements of the 737 Next Generation fuselage assembly line included:
• The vision of a high rate production line building fewer, larger assemblies than
ever had been
accomplished before.  The
single-piece total fuselage
that is made in Wichita and
shipped on a special freight
r
a
i
lcar to Renton, WA is the singular
example of the extent of this
concept.  (See figures to see how
reduced cycle time in final
assembly was achieved by driving
the sealing operation and fuselage
Before
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Figure 7: Unit Cost
“shake” inspection upstream in the production line.  Work-in-progress airframes
in final assembly were reduced from 6 fuselages to 1 fuselage as the achieved 28
per month production rate.)
• The extensive use of CATIA design with the application of Determinant
Assembly, permitting the use of low-cost flexible and rapid setup tooling was a
key factoring in achieving a 28 per month rate of mixed 737 models.
• Co-located IPTs with all functional disciplines located on the factory floor to
support manufacturing enhanced both communication and teamwork.
• A new organization, spearheaded by a strong “Lean Champion”, provided the
leadership for lean transformation.
• A human resource environment that permitted and encouraged freedom of thought
and allowed all employees to rise to the challenge and “own” the ambitious goals
and contribute to lean implementation with their individual expertise, was
extremely important to the attainment of low unit costs per pound of airframe that
had never been seen before.
As a result of all these changes and new implementations, the 737 Next Generation was
not only able to live up to its heritage as the world’s most popular airplane, but set a new
precedent in aircraft production.
The enterprise is extensively involved in this.  Boeing Corporate starts the process with a
value assessment and moves that business plan down through the organizations (of which
Wichita is one) and to the programs (the 737), which are responsible for achieving
continuously improved metrics year after year.  A Boeing corporate Value Scorecard,
which is varied depending on the program, measures the results monthly.i  Executive
performance is evaluated in this Value Scorecard with rewards and recognition based
upon achieved goals.
3.4 External Factors and Developments
The commercial aircraft industry is very competitive.  When the 737 Next Generation
was first set in motion, there were three (3) aircraft vying for the same market—the 737
Classic, the MD-80, and the Airbus A320 series.  In addition, 1993 marked the first
launch of the MD-90.  Both the A320 and MD-80 had been around since the mid-1980’s,
while the 737 had been around since the late 1960’s.  Despite numerous models and
upgrades, the pressure was on Boeing to challenge the newer airplanes from McDonnell
Douglas and Airbus.  The result was a completely new 737, with customer involvement
continuously throughout the design process.  Combined with the low cost and improved
economics, the popularity of the airplane forced Boeing to commit to a production rate of
28 per month, neither of which would have been possible without lean principles.  One of
the key factors in motivating the low cost was a shift in airline customer focus.  Airline
deregulation of ticketing throughout the 1980’s and 90’s resulted in major airline
emphasis on up front acquisition costs, as well as low direct operating costs.
4 REMAINING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
4.1 Remaining Challenges
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the consequent backlash in the airline
community, several airlines approached Boeing and negotiated extended delivery
schedules.  The result is that the Wichita plant no longer has the immediate demand to
produce 28 planes per month, and is currently in the process of “downshifting” to a
production rate of 14 per month.  One clear challenge will be to maintain unit costs
throughout this period.  Behind this challenge, there are many different considerations,
such as cautious overhead adjustments, and acquiring more work in Wichita (including
electrical wiring, hydraulics, environmental control systems) to minimize workforce
reduction.  The benefit of doing so is a reduction of flow time in the Renton final
assembly line.
4.2 Future Opportunities
Boeing’s 737 Next Generation is a great accomplishment, not only from the market
strength of the airplane itself, but also in its wildly successful implementation of lean
principles and practices.  Boeing Wichita has demonstrated effectively that its
management and workforce have mastered the key principles of Lean and have made
major breakthroughs in the production concepts of commercial aircraft.  While applying
this to other portions of the 757, 767, and 777, the Wichita management is keenly aware
that they can be a major player in the proposed Boeing Sonic Cruiser.  In addition, the
military side of Wichita, not studied in this trip, can apply many of the Lean principles to
their major military modification programs on the KC-135, B-52, and C-17 aircraft.
Not only can the entire Boeing company learn from the success of the 737 program, but
the 737 program itself has identified regions to improve.  They are presently attempting
to create an assembly line based on “pull” instead of schedule.
4.3 Lessons Learned
An emergent theme throughout many Lean success stories, including automobile,
electronics, and aircraft, is that major breakthroughs have resulted from a “crisis
situation”.  So too, in the case of the 737, Boeing found itself with a giant order backlog
that required unprecedented production acceleration to fulfill market demands.  Wichita
rose to the challenge with a mighty effort involving the entire organization.  Boeing
management was smart enough to realize they needed to “install” a new seasoned team,
trained and committed to Lean.  It worked!
4.4 Concluding Observations
This study of the 737 fuselage identified the transformation of an “old-line”
manufacturing organization that already had a reputation for building excellent airframe
structures into an even better, “world-class” manufacturing organization that has set new
records for low unit cost, lowest cycle time ever achieved in the commercial aircraft
industry, and superior quality.  This transformation could not have happened without the
comprehensive application of Lean throughout the Structures Value Stream Organization.
In addition, key leadership at the top is a common ingredient in all Lean success stories,
and it was proven again in Wichita.
                                                 
i 737 Structures Center, Kansas Award for Excellence Level III Application, May 31, 2001
